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ABSTRACT
Low-power wide-area networks (LPWANs) are becoming an inte-
gral part of the Internet of Things. As a consequence, businesses,
administration, and, subsequently, society itself depend on the reli-
ability and availability of these communication networks.
Released in 2015, LoRaWAN gained popularity and attracted
the focus of security research, revealing a number of vulnerabil-
ities. This lead to the revised LoRaWAN 1.1 specification in late
2017. Most of previous work focused on simulation and theoretical
approaches. Interoperability and the variety of implementations
complicate the risk assessment for a specific LoRaWAN network.
In this paper, we address these issues by introducing ChirpOTLE,
a LoRa and LoRaWAN security evaluation framework suitable for
rapid iteration and testing of attacks in testbeds and assessing the
security of real-world networks. We demonstrate the potential of
our framework by verifying the applicability of a novel denial-
of-service attack targeting the adaptive data rate mechanism in
a testbed using common off-the-shelf hardware. Furthermore, we
show the feasibility of the Class B beacon spoofing attack, which
has not been demonstrated in practice before.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Denial-of-service attacks; Mo-
bile and wireless security; • Networks→Mobile networks; •
General and reference→ Experimentation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Modern society increasingly relies on connected smart infrastruc-
ture. From the Internet of Things to smart cities and cyber-physical
systems, connectivity becomes the key enabler. Low-power wide-
area networks (LPWANs) are gaining more and more momentum
to support this transition. With technologies like Sigfox, NB-IoT,
LTE-M, LoRaWAN and others competing in this field, the question
for their security arises and has moved into focus of the scientific
community. A thorough analysis of their security properties, poten-
tial threats, and countermeasures is fundamental for the resilient
and reliable operation of connected infrastructure.
We want to foster the research on LPWAN security with a focus
on LoRaWAN. This protocol stands out for its open operator model
and open-source software stacks like ChirpStack [6] and The Things
Stack [18], which enable community-based networks.
While this accessibility of the technology clearly contributed
to LoRaWAN’s popularity, interoperability and implementation-
specific details come with an additional class of security issues.
Most currently known problems affect the LoRaWAN specifica-
tion in version 1.0 and have been addressed in LoRaWAN 1.1 [13].
Research on this topic relies mostly on theoretical discussion or
simulation to confirm potential findings. This focus and the hetero-
geneous environment of software versions and specifications raise
the demand for practical assessment of the feasibility of attacks and
countermeasures in LoRaWAN networks.
In this paper, we present ChirpOTLE, a novel LoRa and Lo-
RaWAN security evaluation framework, to ease practical exper-
imentation in testbeds and security assessments in real-world Lo-
RaWANnetworks. ChirpOTLE orchestrates distributed off-the-shelf
LoRa nodes and comes with the building blocks to rapidly find and
validate potential vulnerabilities.
After giving background information on LoRaWAN in Section 2
and presenting related work in Section 3, we make the following
contributions:
• First, we present an open-source security evaluation frame-
work for LoRaWAN (Section 4).1
• Second, we introduce the concept of wormholes in LoRaWAN
to propose a novel denial-of-service (DoS) attack exploiting
the adaptive data rate (ADR) mechanism (Section 5).
• Third, we present the first experimental evaluation of the
Class B beacon spoofing attack (Section 6).
• Finally, we discuss results and possible countermeasures
(Sections 7 and 8).
We conclude and summarize our work in Section 9.
1https://github.com/seemoo-lab/chirpotle
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2 BACKGROUND ON LORAWAN
LoRaWAN is a specification for an infrastructure to connect sensor
nodes with centrally managed applications and for medium access
control (MAC) using LoRa as physical layer technology.
A LoRaWAN network consists of end devices (EDs) which com-
municate with a central network server (NS). Messages are for-
warded through a LoRa link between the ED and one or more
gateways (GWs) followed by a backing network connection to the
NS. Application data is processed on application servers (ASs) after
being forwarded to them by the NS. In advance to all other com-
munication, EDs and the NS establish a device session either inter-
actively using a mechanism called over-the-air activation (OTAA)
or statically with activation by personalization (ABP).
In this paper, we focus on the wireless LoRa link. By default,
all communication is initiated by the ED, which is called Class A
operation. The ED transmits an uplink message and then waits for
a period drx1 before opening the first receive window called “rx1”.
After an additional delay2 of drx2 , a second receive window (“rx2”)
is opened. drx1 can be configured in a range between 1 s and 15 s,
while drx2 is a fixed value of 1 s [8, Section 5.8]. We use the term
transaction to refer to an uplink message and the optional downlink
response in a corresponding receive window.
The payload of all data messages is encrypted, a message in-
tegrity code (MIC) is appended to messages to protect their in-
tegrity and authenticity, and distinct frame counters (FCnts) for
each communication direction prevent replay attacks.
LoRaWAN manages its MAC layer by the exchange of so-called
MAC commands. These MAC commands can either be sent in the
payload field of a message, if no application data is pending, or
piggy-backed to a data message in a special FOpts field.
Region-specific differences of the specification allow operation
on the industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) bands. We focus
on the EU868 region. We now introduce two relevant LoRaWAN
features for our analysis: ADR and Class B Operation.
2.1 Adaptive Data Rate
Due to the nature of a chirp-spread spectrum (CSS) modulation
like LoRa, transmission times grow quadratic with decreasing data
rate. The same payload can occupy the medium for milliseconds
or seconds, which makes selecting an appropriate data rate (DR)
crucial for performance in dense, large-scale networks, especially
in constrained ISM bands. LoRaWAN employs ADR to address this
issue [8, Section 4.3.1.1]. Its goal is to keep each ED at a certain
demodulation margin, which is the set screw between quality of
service and efficient bandwidth allocation.
An ED activates ADR by setting the ADR flag in its uplink mes-
sages. The NS then collects information on the reception quality for
the ED and once enough data is gathered, issues a LinkADRReqMAC
command, which contains a target DR and transmission power (TP)
for the ED. To cope with frame loss due to collisions, the command
can also be used to limit the ED to specific channels and to request
redundant transmissions using the nbTrans field. By accepting the
request using the LinkADRAnsMAC command, the ED adjusts its
DR for further transmissions.
2In contrast to the use of RECEIVE_DELAY2 in the LoRaWAN specification, we define
drx2 as the delay between receive windows.
To assure connectivity, the ED keeps track of the number of
transactions since the last downlink message in a value called ADR_
ACK_CNT. If this value exceeds a configurable threshold called ADR_
ACK_LIMIT (default: 64), it sets the ADRACKReq flag in each uplink
to encourage the NS to schedule a downlink message. Whenever
the ED receives a downlink message, it resets its ADR_ACK_CNT to
0. If ADR_ACK_CNT, however, exceeds ADR_ACK_LIMIT + ADR_ACK_
DELAY, with the latter being another configurable parameter, the
ED starts to increase its TP and DR stepwise every ADR_ACK_DELAY
transactions, until it eventually receives a response.
Summarized, theADRmechanism is device-induced but network-
controlled. The LoRaWAN specification does not define the exact
algorithm to use on the NS, but Semtech has published a recommen-
dation for an algorithm [10], that has found its way into LoRaWAN
software like ChirpStack3. It collects server-side signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) measurements for up to 20 frames and uses their maxi-
mum to issue the LinkADRReq command. The authors justify the
usage of the maximum by interference being the main reason for
packet loss. Furthermore and in contrast to LoRaWAN 1.0 [9, Sec-
tion 4.3.1.1], LoRaWAN 1.1 explicates that ADR should be requested
for stationary EDs even if the NS signals its inability to appropri-
ately estimate a good configuration. We show how both of these
decisions endanger the reliability of a network under attack.
2.2 Class B Operation
In Class A, downlink traffic must follow uplink messages. Applica-
tions with requirements on downlink latency can operate in Class B,
whereby EDs open additional receive windows. Temporal synchro-
nization is achieved by transmitting network-global beacons every
128 s from GWs based on a global, GPS-synchronized clock.
The EDs use beacon metadata (time of arrival), beacon pay-
load (GPS timestamp), and device properties (device address) to
calculate receive window offsets. Including the address leads to
pseudo-random offsets for each ED and reduces collisions.
Since an ED may be within reach of multiple GWs and to allow
the coexistence of networks from different operators, all beacons
are sent simultaneously to aim for constructive interference [8, Sec-
tion 15.2, Note 1]. As a direct consequence, the payload of beacons
cannot undergo meaningful encryption nor authentication, since
keys would need to be available for all network operators.
To enable Class B, the ED starts by searching and locking to
beacons frames. Once a stable lock exists, it transmits all further
uplink messages with the ClassB flag set to notify the NS about
the class switch. This process can be sped up by requesting the
current time from theNS using the DeviceTimeReqMAC command,
allowing the ED to estimate the next arrival of a beacon. When
the lock is lost, the ED runs at least two hours of “beacon-less
operation”, in which it gradually widens all Class B receive windows
before eventually switching back to Class A [8, Section 5.12].
3 RELATEDWORK
We present the relevant related work in three parts: Studies on ADR
performance, on jamming and wormholes, and on beacon spoofing.
Most previous work on ADR covers performance aspects. Li et al.
give a simulation-based performance evaluation of Semtech’s ADR
3cf. https://github.com/brocaar/chirpstack-network-server/blob/v3.6.0/internal/adr/
ChirpOTLE: A Framework for Practical LoRaWAN Security Evaluation WiSec ’20, July 8–10, 2020, Linz (Virtual Event), Austria
algorithm with a focus on time to convergence [16]. Their results
show that approaching convergence from high DRs is notably more
time-consuming than from low DRs, meaning that over-optimizing
the DR causes a prolonged decline of ED availability.
Alternative server-side algorithms for ADR have been proposed
for a variety of optimization goals. Bor and Roedig suggest using a
probing-based mechanism to determine the best DR for each device
[5]. Most other approaches, however, strive for global optimization
by considering all EDs within a certain region. Reynders et al. pro-
pose a cell-based algorithm that aims for fairer packet error rates
in the outer region of a cell based on node distance or path-loss
estimation [19]. Abdelfadeel et al. extend this work and suggest
to use fairness regarding equal overall collision probability as a
goal [1]. Cuomo et al. designate the greediness of the default ADR
algorithm to use high DRs as a main cause for network congestion
and also propose two alternative schemes. They exploit the orthog-
onality of different spreading factors (SFs) to equalize DR usage
either by the number of devices or by expected air time [12]. To
our best knowledge, none of the proposed algorithms considers the
presence of intentionally manipulated SNR measurements.
Due to its CSS modulation, jamming LoRa is most effective by
exploiting coexistence issues with CSS signals. Goursaud and Gorce
compare CSS to ultra-narrow band (UNB) modulation and show
that LoRa mainly interferes with other LoRa signals [15]. They
prove that interference between LoRa frames of different SFs is
low while a signal of the same SF has to be at least 6 dB stronger
to demodulate it by benefiting from the capture effect. Croce et al.
underline these findings by simulations and experiments and also
point out that orthogonality between SFs is limited [11].
Aras et al. use this knowledge to create a LoRa jammer based on
off-the-shelf hardware which can perform triggered and payload-
based reactive jamming [2, 3]. They also evaluate a unidirectional
store-and-forward wormhole based on two nodes which handles
frames of SF10 and above reliably.
Miller mentions a beacon spoofing attack shortly after the publi-
cation of LoRaWAN 1.0.0, either to manipulate the beacon’s payload
or to tamper with the calculation of receive windows [17]. Van Es
et al. formally verify the possibility of injecting malicious beacons
with modified time values to provoke calculating invalid receive
window offsets on the EDs [22]. Yang et al. also discuss the impact
of modification to different beacon payload fields [24]. Contrary to
their proposition, it is not possible to change the wakeup periodic-
ity and drain ED’s battery by changing the beacon payload. Butun
et al. assess beacon spoofing to be relevant for LoRaWAN 1.1 [7].
4 SECURITY EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
LoRaWAN is a distributed and heterogeneous system built on an
infrastructure consisting of NSs, ASs, and GWs. The different pro-
tocols and the network infrastructure connecting all of these com-
ponents provide many options for conducting a security evaluation,
but also demand for a specific attacker model when it comes to
security evaluation.
4.1 Attacker and Threat Model
We limit our scope to the wireless link between EDs and GWs. This
decision comes with the least preconditions in the attacker model,
ChirpOTLE node ChirpOTLE node ChirpOTLE node
. . . . . .
controller nodenode configuration
interactive evaluation scripted experiments
Figure 1: Architecture of the ChirpOTLE framework
as the wireless communication channel is, by its nature, accessible
to everyone within proximity.
Furthermore, we limit the attacker to use only inexpensive off-
the-shelf LoRa hardware to emphasize the low requirements for
reproducing the attacks. Using only LoRa transceivers intended for
use in EDs, however, comes with challenges: Chips like Semtech’s
SX127x series can only handle one channel and DR at a time.
We assume the attacker to be able to transmit and receive ar-
bitrary LoRa frames on a given channel. The location of devices,
network configuration, and other publicly observable metadata like
uplink periodicity of EDs is assumed to be known by the attacker.
However, the attacker is not in possession of any cryptographic
keys or other data that is marked as protected in the LoRaWAN
specification, nor she is able to break cryptographic primitives.
4.2 Framework Design and Architecture
Based on this attacker model, we design and implement ChirpOTLE,
our LoRa and LoRaWAN security evaluation framework. The main
challenge is the physical layer interaction within the coverage area
of the network under test. Furthermore, attacks involving worm-
holes require forwarding frames between different locations, while
some decisions are made and actions are run locally on the node,
due to strict timing constraints. Selective jamming, for instance,
needs quick decisions for or against jamming a frame while it is still
in transmission. From these requirements, we identify two main
components of the framework: First, a set of LoRa field nodes with
real-time support and a network interface for configuration and
out-of-band communication. Second, a controller that orchestrates
their actions in complex interaction patterns.
Figure 1 gives a high-level overview of the resulting architecture.
Using a flexible, file-based node configuration allows fast adaption
to given network topology and available hardware. With Python as
a high-level language on the controller node, we can use its built-in
REPL interface for interactive assessment of vulnerabilities and
evaluation of new attacks. This environment inherently allows run-
ning scripts to generate quantitative experimental results without
manual intervention.
To fulfill the real-time requirements and to address a great variety
of off-the-shelf hardware, we implement a low-level companion ap-
plication based on RIOT [4], an operating system formicrocontroller
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Figure 2: Control flow in the security evaluation framework
units (MCUs). This application connects to SX127x-compatible LoRa
radios through SPI and provides the host with a serial interface for
higher-level commands like switching the channel or activating a
jammer.
To combine both, the low-level MCU application and the high-
level scripting environment for experiment design, we use the TPy
framework [21]. It simplifies deployment and control in distributed
network experiments. Together with the node configuration, its
remote procedure call (RPC) abstraction layer hides communication
details between controller and ChirpOTLE nodes in the field, as
shown in Figure 2. One or more MCUs executing the companion
application can be hooked up to a lightweight RPC host, for example,
a Raspberry Pi, that handles network communication and translates
RPC calls into commands for the serial interface of the MCU.
5 WORMHOLES IN LORAWAN
The concept of wormholes in LoRaWAN is different from the typical
understanding, as LoRa is only utilized on a single hop between
EDs and GWs. Usually, wormholes exploit a faster out-of-bound
connection to relay messages of a multi-hop network, exceeding
the network’s own forwarding speed. All LoRaWAN wormholes
follow a store-and-forward principle to bridge a single hop.
Since communication of LoRaWAN Class A EDs is only uplink-
induced, bidirectional LoRaWAN wormholes are constrained by the
receive windows of a transaction to forward downlink messages.
We use a simple unidirectional wormhole as a foundation to present
two more sophisticated, downlink-enabled approaches. We then
incorporate them into an attack exploiting the ADR mechanism of
LoRaWAN.
5.1 Unidirectional Wormhole
Figure 3 shows the message flow within a unidirectional, uplink-
only wormhole: One of the attacker’s transceiver acts as the entry
node and is placed near the target ED. Another transceiver serves
as an exit node near the GWs. A LoRa frame upn is captured in its
entirety by the entry node and forwarded to the wormhole’s exit
node through an out-of-bound channel. The exit node then replays
the message up′n for the GW to receive.
If the ED is within reach of the GW, the exit node can be con-
figured to selectively jam the reception of frames while the entry
End Device Attacker Gateway
upn jammed
rx1 window
drx1
rx2 window
drx2
up′nreplay
tprocessinд
tuplink
downn
misses both rx windows drx1
tdownlink
frame sent frame received
preamble payload
Figure 3: Message flow of the unidirectional wormhole
node still receives them. This approach differs from the LoRa worm-
hole introduced in [3] by the jammer’s trigger. We discovered that
listening on the exit node and quickly switching it to jamming is
significantly faster than triggering the jammer by the sniffer via
network. This allows selective jamming based on the DevAddr even
for SF7 and still receiving the messages at the entry node, if the
jammer’s signal is at least 6 dB weaker at the source [15].
A wormhole cannot alter the LoRaWAN message content, as it
is protected by a MIC. However, the attacker can modify metadata
of the message, in particular the timing, the location, SNR, and
received signal strength indication (RSSI) values. If the device and
network under attack both conform to the LoRaWAN 1.1 specifica-
tion, an attacker has to replay uplink messages on the same channel
and DR, as those parameters take part in the MIC calculation in the
updated specification [8, Section 4.4.2]. That was not the case in
LoRaWAN 1.0.x [9, Section 4.4], which allows replay attacks with
different transmission parameters.
5.2 RX2 Wormhole
The attacker cannot replay the downlinkmessage in the rx1window
of a transaction. Figure 3 illustrates how the rx1 window starts at a
fixed delay of drx1 measured from the end of the uplink message
upn . So when receiving the replayed message up′n , the NS will
respond not earlier than drx1 after that.
The transmission parameters of LoRaWAN downlink messages
are not protected by the message’s MIC, even in LoRaWAN 1.1
[8, Section 4.4.1]. Therefore, an attacker may aim for the second
receive window to forward the downlink message. The additional
delay can be exploited to circumvent the timing constraints.
Figure 4 illustrates the principle of the rx2 wormhole. Downlink
messages are scheduled to match the rx2 window. The diagram also
illustrates the remaining timing constraints of such a wormhole.
The duration of the replayed uplink tuplink , of the original down-
link tdownlink , and additional time for processing, tproc1 and tproc2 ,
all together must not exceed the duration of the time between both
receive windows:
tproc1 + tuplink + drx1 + tdownlink + tproc2 ≤ drx1 + drx2
tproc1 + tuplink + tdownlink + tproc2 ≤ 1 s (= drx2 )
(1)
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Figure 4: Message flow of the rx2 wormhole
Assuming a negligible processing time and equal frame lengths
for uplink and downlink, we get an upper boundary for the trans-
mission time of 500ms per frame. A LoRa frame containing the
LoRaWAN data has a length of at least 12 bytes. Figure 5 puts both
of these limitations in relation to the DRs for the EU868 region.
It is evident that the rx2 wormhole breaks the timing constraints
for DR0 and DR1. For DR2 and DR3, it can be used if small or
medium-sized LoRaWAN payloads are expected. These downsides
are compensated by the advantage of keeping both frames in the
same transaction. This is in particular important for confirmed
uplinks, as the MIC of the corresponding downlink is only valid
during the same transaction in LoRaWAN 1.1 [8, Section 4.4.1] as a
response to the ACK spoofing attack on LoRaWAN 1.0 [13, 23].
5.3 Downlink-Delayed Wormhole
By expanding the wormhole concept over two consecutive transac-
tions, an attacker achieves the ability to target low DRs at the cost
of not being able to handle confirmed uplink messages in LoRaWAN
1.1. We call this approach the downlink-delayed wormhole. Figure
6 shows how the uplink message upn is intercepted, sniffed, and
then replayed as up′n . If the NS responds with a downlink message
downn , it is not immediately forwarded but stored by the attacker.
Once the ED transmits the next uplink messageupn+1, it is again
sniffed and jammed. If a pending downlink message has been stored
by the attacker, the priority is to forward it back to the ED through
the entry node. As the entire message is already available, the
attacker can aim for the rx1 window. When the downlink message
has been delivered, the attacker eventually forwards the stored
uplink message upn+1 through the exit node to the NS, which may
return the next pending downlink downn+1.
This approach overcomes the issues with high DRs at the cost
of crossing transaction boundaries. For multi-channel networks,
this also adds complications regarding the downlink FCnt. When
staying within the same transaction, a downlink message from the
NS always contains the current maximum for the FCnt. This is
important since the ED will only accept messages with a higher
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Figure 5: LoRa frame transmission time in relation to DR
(EU868) and payload length. LoRaWAN uplink configuration
with header and payload CRC on physical layer
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drx2 down′n
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downlink
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store, then
replay later
downn+1
drx1
Figure 6: Message flow of the downlink-delayed wormhole
FCnt. If an attacker cannot observe all channels at all DRs, she may
miss a transaction in which a higher downlink FCnt is processed
by the ED. In that case, the stored downlink frame of the attacker
becomes outdated, as its FCnt prevents it from being accepted.
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5.4 FromWormholes to ADR Spoofing
The ADR spoofing attack exploits the ADR mechanism to force the
ED into using a TP and DR at which it is unable to communicate
with any GW. An attacker can intentionally create such a situation
by selectively forwarding messages through a wormhole to manip-
ulate their metadata. The ED’s RSSI and SNR then appear as being
higher for the NS. Employing these values in the ADR calculation
leads to too optimistic estimates for the target TP and DR.
Once the ED adapted to the new DR, the attacker decides which
messages to forward to the NS. To keep the ED in this state, at least
one transaction out of ADR_ACK_LIMIT + ADR_ACK_DELAYmust pass
the wormhole. This prevents the ED from increasing TP and lower-
ing the DR because its ADR_ACK_CNT is reset to 0.
From this description, we can identify two phases of the attack:
First, the spoofing phase, in which the attacker intercepts messages
on the initial DR, and second, the retention phase, in which the ED
is forced to keep its settings by selective forwarding.
While the decision to enable ADR is made on the ED, the choice
of the actual parameters is made on the NS and announced in
a LinkADRReq MAC command. Therefore, the attacker has two
concerns during the spoofing phase: First, to forward uplink frames
with good reception parameters to trigger a LinkADRReq command
with a high DR, and second, to forward the downlink message
containing this command to the ED. This calls for the deployment
of a bidirectional wormhole. Since the attack is most effective if the
ED can only communicate on low DRs by default, the attacker may
need to pick the downlink-delayed variant for spoofing.
Once the ED has processed the LinkADRReq, it immediately
switches to the higher DR and confirms the new settings with
a LinkADRAns in the next uplink message. The attacker does not
forward this message, as a chance exists that the LinkADRReq will
remain unacknowledged in the NS’s MAC command queue. If that
is the case, the NS itself will push the ED back to the higher DR
without any additional effort, should a link be reestablished. Since
MAC commands are only acknowledged once [8, Section 5, Note
2], this can create a self-reinforcing situation until the LinkADRReq
at the NS times out.
To not rely only on the NS, the attacker also creates a wormhole
on the “optimized” DR. For this DR, the rx2 wormhole is sufficient,
which comes with fewer complications. We assume an ideal case of
no communication between the ED and GW without the help of
the attacker. The most reliable strategy for the attacker to achieve
her goals then would be to selectively forward a transaction if the
ADRAckReq flag is set. The NS processes the message and ideally
issues a downlink message to reset the ADR_ACK_CNT of the ED.
If the ADRACKReq flag is unset in the next transaction, the ED has
processed the downlink and ADR_ACK_CNT is reset.
The most critical task for the attacker is to ascertain whether and
when the ED changed the DR. The plain LinkADRReq command can
only be observed if it is transmitted piggy-backed in a LoRaWAN 1.0
setup. In all other situations, MAC commands are encrypted, which
only allows inferring the total length of all MAC commands in
the message. Furthermore, observing downlink messages does not
guarantee that they are received and processed by the ED. With the
given capabilities and a single node, the attacker cannot receive the
uplink message containing LinkADRAns after DR adaption and still
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Figure 7: Concept of the beacon drifting attack
observe the initial channel. In that case, a probabilistic approach
makes sense. With n being the number of channels on the network
and fup being the ED’s uplink periodicity, we calculate:
tt imeout =
1
fup
∗
⌈
log n−1
n
(0.01)
⌉
(2)
After not receiving messages for tt imeout , an attacker listening
to a single channel can assume that the ED has switched the DR in
99% of all cases and proceed to the retention phase. For a network
with 3 channels, this corresponds to 12 uplink messages.
6 BEACON SPOOFING
Another attack that creates a DoS situation by tampering with net-
work parameters is beacon spoofing. In contrast to ADR spoofing,
beacon spoofing affects all Class B EDs within reach of the attacker.
The affected devices lose their ability to receive network-induced
downlink traffic.
The concept behind this attack has been discussed [7, 22], but to
our knowledge, no proof exists showing its practical applicability. It
is based on everyone’s ability to create valid Class B beacon frames,
which inherently is required for the coexistence of LoRaWAN net-
works with different operators. If an attacker transmits beacon
frames with an offset, all EDs locked to the fake beacon do not open
their receive windows on time.
While periodically transmitting frames is a quite feasible task,
forcing already locked EDs to switch to the spoofed beacons re-
quires a bit more effort. Locked devices open their beacon receive
window only just before they expect to receive a beacon. EDs search-
ing for beacons utilize DeviceTimeReq commands to reduce the
size of their beacon search window. Targeting only EDs in the
beacon acquisition phase reduces the applicability of the attack
drastically. Therefore, we focus on already locked EDs only.
By first locking to the legitimate beacon herself, an attacker syn-
chronizes with the network’s time without access to GPS. Then,
she starts the beacon drifting as shown in Figure 7. While stay-
ing within the receive window tolerance of the EDs, she slowly
prepones the transmission of the spoofed beacon by ∆tstep each
beacon period. If the step size is chosen small enough, the EDs shift
their beacon receive window together with the spoofed beacon.
Once the accumulated drift corresponds to at least an entire bea-
con frame length, the attacker can stop shifting. Using this stop
ChirpOTLE: A Framework for Practical LoRaWAN Security Evaluation WiSec ’20, July 8–10, 2020, Linz (Virtual Event), Austria
criterion aims at minimizing the collision time with the legitimate
beacon. The beacon frame duration in EU868 is 152.58ms. For our
experiments, we add a margin of 5 symbols, which corresponds to
half a beacon preamble, leading to a total drift of 173.06ms. EDs
open their receive windows early by the same offset and close them
before a downlink transmission starts.
As the beacon frames are sent in implicit header mode without
a CRC on the physical layer, the attacker can bring in another
measure to increase her success rate. Bytes added to the end of the
beacon frame are discarded by all receivers, as the expected frame
length has to be known in this transmission mode. The attacker
can exploit this by adding random data as a jamming payload after
the beacon data, which then coexists with the legitimate beacon
frame, making it harder for EDs to stay locked with it.
If the attacker is successful, the ED sticks to the spoofed bea-
con as long as the attacker transmits it, because the ED can only
detect beacon presence, but not downlink availability. Once the
attacker stops transmitting beacons, the EDs perform two hours of
beaconless operation and eventually return to Class A.
7 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
An experimental evaluation of the two attacks requires bringing
the ChirpOTLE nodes together with LoRaWAN network entities in
a testbed. This section summarizes the network configuration and
topology used for our experiments.
7.1 Network Configuration
As the specification does not cover all implementation-specific
details for the operation of a network, running an experimental
evaluation of LoRaWAN always yields results in the context of the
selected software. All experiments in this study use ChirpStack 3.6.
LoRaWAN libraries for EDs come in much greater variety than
software for network infrastructure, with a reference implementa-
tion being available. We deploy its LoRaWAN 1.1 branch4 on an
ST Nucleo L476 evaluation board with an SX1276MB1xAS LoRa
transceiver to create our device under test. The software already
comes with sample applications for Class A and B operation.
We configure these applications to use ABP and extend them
with remote-control to allow for automation. These modifications
do not affect the behavior of the LoRaWAN implementation with
the only exception of forcing the nbTrans parameter to a constant
value of 1. This decision creates comparable conditions for each
trial even if the NS decides for a different redundancy configuration.
We limit the NS and ED to use only the three default channels
from the EU868 region (cf. ETSI EN-330 200-1, Section 7.2.3 [14]), at
868.1MHz, 868.3MHz and 868.5MHz. This allows verifying that a
single LoRa transceiver is sufficient to run attacks against a multi-
channel network. In Section 8.1, we extrapolate the insights from
our experiments to networks with larger channel lists. On the
uplink channels, DR0 to DR5 are enabled, which correspond to SFs
12 to 7, respectively, all at 125 kHz channel bandwidth. For the rx2
downlink window and Class B downlink transmissions, we use the
default channel of 869.525MHz at DR0. RECEIVE_DELAY1 is set to
1 second.
4We use commit 92e37147 of the feature-5.0.0 branch in https://github.com/Lora-
net/LoRaMac-node.
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7.2 Topology
The ED and a GW are placed at two locations in a way that the
channel attenuates the LoRa signal by at least 6 dB, which is a
requirement for jamming-based attacks [15]. This is particularly
important if an attacker needs to sniff frames at their source and
simultaneously prevent them from reaching their destination.
We also equip the GW’s antenna port with an attenuator to
fine-tune the SNR for frames from the ED to be just below −7.5 dB,
which is the required SNR for receiving on DR5 [10]. This allows
us to test the ADR spoofing attack for a variety of initial DRs.
Baseline measurements of the channel properties after applying
both measures are depicted in Figure 8. A nearly perfect receive
rate for the lower DRs and its drop for DR4 and DR5 show that the
setup is tuned well for the experiments.
With the network being configured, we introduce the ChirpOTLE
nodes to the topology, as depicted in Figure 9. Both LoRaWAN
network entities, the ED and the GW, are each collocated with a
single attacker node, called NodeED and NodeGW, respectively.
Each ChirpOTLE node consists of a Pycom LoPy 4 connected to
a Raspberry Pi. It also runs the TPy LoRa Node interface for remote-
controlling the LoPy 4. The ChirpOTLE controller, the ChirpStack
NS API, and the ED’s output are monitored centrally to collect
measurements during the experiments.
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8 RESULTS
For the evaluation, we ran 20 trials for each configuration of inde-
pendent variables. Before each trial, the ED was reactivated on the
NS using ABP. Then the ED was reset and the attacker’s state was
cleared to guarantee independence between trials.
8.1 ADR Spoofing
For the wormhole attack on ADR, we use NodeED as the entry node
and NodeGW as the exit node of the wormholes (cf. Figure 9).
We vary the parameters shown in Table 1. We evaluate both
wormhole types with all DRs to see if the actual behavior of the
network matches our expectation of the rx2 wormhole being inca-
pable of handling DR0 and DR1 traffic. The LoRaWAN application
data length is set to a single byte to keep it well in the acceptable
range for DR2 and DR3. Changing the number of preceding uplink
messages between reset of the ED and start of the attack fills the
server-side time series of SNR measurements at different levels.
8.1.1 Wormhole Type and Data Rate. First, we look upon the suc-
cess of the attacker in the spoofing phase to verify the attack’s
effectiveness. We define success as the processing of a LinkADRReq
with the target DR by the ED. Figure 10 shows that this is achieved
in most trials, with a few exceptions for the low DRs and the rx2
wormhole. In all other cases, the ED is forced into the higher DR.
Table 1: Evaluation parameters for the ADR spoofing attack
Parameter Evaluated Values
spoofing phase: wormhole type downlink-delayed, rx2
spoofing phase: data rate DR0, DR1, DR2, DR3
uplinks preceding the attack 1, 10, 20
Table 2: Number of transactions from start of attack until
the DR is adjusted to the target DR
Preceding Uplinks Number of Transactions (mean, SD) n
1 7.74 ± 5.0 158
10 7.58 ± 5.79 153
20 7.92 ± 5.57 158
DR0
DR1
DR2
DR3
DR5
t (ms)
0 500 1000 1500 2000
t0 rx1 rx2
up′n downn down′ntproc1 drx1 tproc2
sent by attackersent by network
Figure 11: Measured timing of the rx2 wormhole
Figure 10 also depicts how the message containing the critical
LinkADRReq command reaches the ED. The results match our ex-
pectations about the different capabilities of the wormhole types.
For the rx2 wormhole, a clear distinction exists between DRs. On
DR2 and DR3, the attacker could directly forward the message to
the ED. Notably, the attack does not fail for the lower DRs. Frames
with high SNR values still reach the NS, and even though the down-
link traffic cannot be sent back by the wormhole, the NS adds a
LinkADRReq to the ED’s MAC command queue. From there, it is
delivered on a frequency not observed by the attacker.
Figure 11 shows the actual timing of the rx2 wormhole during
the attack, also including measurements for DR5 from the retention
phase. The attacker is incapable of handling DR1 and DR0 as the
downlink frame is not complete when the rx2 window opens. All
other DRs leave a sufficiently large margin for processing.
For the downlink-delayed wormhole, the results are different,
with roughly a third of the messages reaching the ED through the
wormhole for all DRs. The reason for this ratio is the network’s
channel list’s size. For forwarding, the downlink-delayed wormhole
needs two consecutive transactions on the same frequency. For our
three-channel-network, this happens at 33.3% after observing the
first transaction, if transactions are treated independently. So it
is reasonable to assume that a full eight-channel-network can be
attacked as well with an increase in time to success.
8.1.2 ADR Algorithm State. In the next step, we verify that the
previous state of the ADR algorithm on the NS does not affect
the attack. Therefore, we vary the number of uplinks preceding
the attack and measure the number of transactions before the end
device is reconfigured through ADR. The result is shown in Table 2.
As expected, the fill level of the SNR table on the NS did not
affect the ADR decision. The reason for this is the usage of the max
operator instead of averaging over the collected values.
8.1.3 Retaining the Device. Once the ED processes the LinkADRReq,
the attacker proceeds to the retention phase. The initial DR, worm-
hole type, and ADR algorithm state do not affect success in retain-
ing, so we aggregate results from all trials reaching this phase.
We first evaluate the overall success of the attacker in this phase,
which we define by successfully resetting the ADR_ACK_CNT of the
ED and by a low ratio of successful uplinks. In all 469 trials that
made it into the retention phase, the attacker was able to retain
the ED on its high DR. For 95% of trials, the uplink success rate
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Figure 12: Downlink availability during beacon drifting
dropped below 2.88%, for 99%, it was still below 3.11%. This value
cannot reach 0% while remaining successful in keeping the ED in
its state, as ADRAckReq flags have to be answered to. For our ED
with a low ADR_ACK_LIMIT of 32, nearly all of the uplink messages
are intentional passes through the wormhole.
8.1.4 Countermeasures. We have seen that tricking the ED in us-
ing unsuitable DRs is possible with a high success rate even for
LoRaWAN 1.1. The attack does not have a single enabling vulnera-
bility, but several contributing factors.
Themissing relation ofmessages within a transaction enables the
wormhole attacks. As a reaction to ACK spoofing in LoRaWAN 1.1,
the uplink FCnt was included in a downlink MIC, but only if the
uplink ACK flag is set. If that was the case for all Class A mes-
sages, the downlink-delayed wormhole would be prevented. Also,
transmission parameters like DR and frequency are only included
in the uplink MIC. Including them also in downlink MICs would
prevent the rx2 wormhole. The FHDR field containing the ADR and
ADRACKReq flags lacks confidentiality protection. Protecting FHDR
restrains the attacker from identifying frames that need forwarding.
ADR algorithms are designed with performance in mind, but
not security or robustness. For example, averaging the SNR over
several messages can prevent abrupt changes from a single data
point. If only uplink messages with plausible SNR values are di-
rectly answered with LinkADRReqs and a strong relation between
messages within a transaction is implemented, the success of ADR
spoofing would decrease significantly.
Table 3: Evaluated values for ∆tstep and estimated duration
of the beacon drifting attack
∆tstep full beacon length reached after
symbols time beacon periods time
1 4.096ms 38 81:04 min
2 8.192ms 19 40:32 min
3 12.288ms 13 27:44 min
4 16.384ms 10 21:20 min
6 24.576ms 7 14:56 min
8 32.768ms 5 10:40 min
Without these changes, a workaround is to deploy a denser GW
distributionwith fewer EDs being only in the vicinity of a single GW
or losing connection on high DRs. This is, however, contradictory
to the LPWAN’s paradigm of using a sparse infrastructure.
8.2 Beacon Spoofing
Beacon spoofing requires only NodeED near the target ED. We vary
the drifting step size ∆tstep as shown in Table 3. For each trial,
we wait until at least one downlink message is received in a ping
slot after resetting the ED to avoid setup problems being falsely
attributed to the attacker’s success. We quantify Class B downlink
availability under attack by queuing a downlink message in each
beacon period and counting its arrival at the ED. The measurements
include the period directly before the attack and three periods after
shifting has stopped.
8.2.1 Impact of Step Size. Our results in Figure 12 reveal two out-
comes: For ∆tstep of 1, 2, and 3 symbols, downlink availability
drops significantly after 9, 3, and 2 beacon periods, respectively. For
greater values of ∆tstep , it remains mostly unaffected at roughly
80% and above. We conclude that the attack fails if the beacon is
shifted too aggressively, most likely by exceeding the ED’s receive
window tolerance.
The downlink degrades faster for higher values of ∆tstep . Relat-
ing ∆tstep and the beacon period during which the communication
breaks down yields a threshold of around 9 symbol lengths. Once
the beacon is shifted further, the timing of the downlink windows
between the ED and NS diverges too far to communicate.
We want to verify that the degrade in downlink quality is indeed
caused by the ED being locked to the spoofed beacon. Transmitting
a distinct value in the attacker’s frames allows distinguishing them
from the true ones. The GwInfo field is well-suited for this purpose,
as it does not take part in the calculation of downlink windows.
Figure 13 shows the received beacon type over time for each
value of ∆tstep . The ED may either receive the true, or the spoofed
beacon, or no beacon at all. If a beacon frame cannot be decoded cor-
rectly, we count it as lost, since ping slot offsets cannot be calculated
without the payload. Consistent with our previous results, we see
that the ED is locked to the spoofed beacon if ∆tstep ≤ 3 symbols.
For greater values, the ED does not lock to the spoofed beacon but
loses track of the true one. The effect remains for several periods
depending on the step size. For ∆tstep = 4 symbols, the ED recov-
ers after 7 periods, while it only takes 3 periods if the attacker uses
∆tstep = 8 symbols. So, contrary to our expectations, appending
jamming payload does not prevent the ED from re-locking.
To examine the situation further, Figure 14 depicts the beacon
SNRmeasured at the ED during the attack. For low values of ∆tstep ,
the SNR increases significantly with the start of the attack and re-
mains high with low variance. In these cases, the nearby attacker
node exploits the capture effect. The situation is different for the
trials with a fast drift. SNR levels before the attack starts are compa-
rable. While the beacon is lost, no values can be measured. Then, the
measurements plateau around a value of −5 dB, but with a higher
variance, which can be ascribed to the presence of the attacker’s
signal. Jamming with the extended payload most likely fails since its
random symbols do not disturb the receiver’s autocorrelation-based
detection and synchronization mechanism.
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8.2.2 Countermeasures. We have shown that an attacker can dis-
rupt the Class B downlink of EDs in proximity repeatably in less
than ten minutes. This implies severe consequences for applications
relying on a guaranteed downlink latency, especially if no periodic
uplink allows for graceful degradation of the service.
With the current requirement for network-spanning beacon-
ing, no effective authentication-based countermeasure is applicable.
Loosening this requirement and returning to network-specific bea-
cons as specified in earlier drafts of LoRaWAN 1.0 [20, Section 15.1]
would allow adding an authentication code to the beacon. Not trans-
mitting beacons every 128 s based on the GPS epoch, but with an
additional network-specific offset in the [0 s, 127 s] interval, could
assure network coexistence. Since beacons are transmitted with
inverse polarity to downlink traffic, additional beacon frames are
negligible as a source of interference for the actual downlink traffic
on the same channel. By transmitting the beacon authentication
key during OTAA for specific devices, exposing it in non-volatile
device memory is avoided and compromised keys can be replaced.
Without modification of the specification, the attack cannot be
prevented. An ED can only try to detect it, for example by observing
changes in the beacon’s SNR or a leaping Class A downlink FCnt.
If an attack is suspected, a compensation strategy should be used.
Periodic uplinks assure a minimum level of downlink latency in
that case but come at the cost of higher energy consumption. If the
NS has evidence that Class B downlink fails, its only option would
be to use a ForceRejoinReq MAC command on the next uplink to
force the ED to rejoin the network in Class A [8, Section 9].
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced two attacks affecting the availability
of LoRaWAN networks and demonstrated their practical feasibility
using ChirpOTLE, our LoRaWAN security evaluation framework.
As the foundation for the novel ADR spoofing attack, we in-
troduced two concepts of bidirectional wormholes for LoRaWAN
which apply even to the latest specification of LoRaWAN 1.1. Our re-
sults show that these wormholes are capable of manipulating frame
metadata in LoRaWAN networks. This enables the ADR spoofing
attack, which allows disrupting the communication for EDs located
at the edge of the network with a high success rate.
We also introduced the concept of beacon drifting as a concrete
attack for the vulnerability of missing beacon authentication, which
has been mentioned in literature before. We found that by gradually
shifting malicious beacon frames, an attacker may disrupt Class B
downlink communication within an area in less than ten minutes.
We propose countermeasures for both attacks, which require
revising the current specification. Without a change to the specifi-
cation, the attacks can only be complicated, but not prevented.
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